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Are Intra-Household Allocations Policy Neutral? 
Theory and Empirical Evidence
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We develop a collective household model with spousal matching in which there exists marital 
gains to assortative matching and marriage quality for each couple is revealed ex post. 
Changes in alimony laws are shown to affect existing couples and couples-to-be differently. 
For existing couples, legislative changes that favor (wo)men benefit them especially if the 
marriage match quality is low, while, for couples not yet formed, they generate offsetting 
intra-household transfers and lower intra-marital allocations for the spouses who are the 
intended beneficiary. We then estimate the effect of granting alimony rights to cohabiting 
couples in Canada using a triple-difference framework since each province extended these 
rights in different years and requiring different cohabitation length. We find that obtaining the 
right to petition for alimony led women to lower their labor force participation. These results, 
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own. 1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Becker (1973), economists have greatly progressed in their under-
standing of household behavior, from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. In
particular, several empirical studies have established that factors aecting spousal bargain-
ing power or marriage-market conditions, such as targeted transfers, laws governing divorce,
alimony and abortion, or marriage-market sex ratios, also aect the allocation of household
resources (Duo 2000, Angrist, 2002, Chiappori et al., 2002, Orece 2007, Attanasio and
Lec h ene 2009, to cite just a few). Several of these contributions exploit particular policy
changes as natural experiments in order to identify the impact of certain policies on household
behavior (e.g., labor supply). Such studies, however, do not distinguish couples already mar-
ried at the time of reforms from those couples that formed subsequently. Theory, however,
strongly suggests that the impact of policy on outcomes is conditional on when partnerships
were formed. For existing couples, policy changes would typically aect spouses' respec-
tive bargaining powers (and possibly their divorce probabilities) in a straightforward way.
Switching the post-divorce allocation of household wealth from private property to equal
division, for instance, would generally favor the poorer spouse. The case of couples mar-
ried after the reforms is potentially more complex, however. In particular, if individuals are
forward-looking, changes that aect future bargaining positions would be taken into account
in the initial matching phase, resulting in a dierent initial allocation of household resources,
matching patterns, and possibly changes in pre-marital behavior (as discussed in Lafortune,
2010). Moreover, such eects may vary both through time and by the type and degree of
commitment available to couples. In other words, one would expect that individuals who
are \caught" by changes would behave dierently than those who are able to react to the
policy before entering into a union; and the specic nature of such responses deserve both a
careful theoretical analysis and an empirical investigation.
In this paper, we present some theory and empirics that highlight such marriage-market
and intra-household allocation eects. To that end, we present an integrated collective house-
hold model where the matching process as well as the prospect of divorce or separation are
embedded into the collective analysis.
The main ingredients of our model are as follows: There is a continuum of men and
women who live for two periods. Each agent is characterized by a single attribute, income
(or human capital), with continuous distributions of incomes on both sides of the marriage
market, so that each agent has a close substitute. The economic gains from marriage arise
from joint consumption of a public good and a non-monetary common factor that is match
specic. This match quality for each couple is revealed ex post and those with poor matches
1may divorce. Finally, we rely on a `Becker-Coase' framework, in the sense that utility is
transferable both during the union and after separation.
Using this theoretical framework, we consider a reform that increases the wives' share
of incomes after divorce, such as a universal increase in the mandatory (share of) alimony
payments. Such a change in post-divorce property rights cannot aect divorce probabil-
ities in our Becker-Coase world. However, it may (and does) inuence the allocation of
resources within a household, both before and after divorce | even among couples who do
not eventually divorce.
We show that the short- and long-term consequences of reform are dierent and generally
opposite of one another. For partnerships already in existence at the time of the legislative
change, an increase in mandatory alimony payments can only improve the wives' welfare
at the husbands' expense. While the exact scope of the reform depends on assumptions
regarding commitment, either some or all women will strictly gain and no woman can lose
(equivalently, no man can gain). Regarding couples who marry after the reform, the logic
is quite dierent, because the new divorce settlement is taken into account at the matching
stage, resulting in a dierent inter-temporal allocation of resources and welfare between
spouses. Specically, a change in alimony settlement laws aimed at favoring women will
typically generate osetting intra-household transfers, eventually resulting in lower intra-
marital allocations for all married women, particularly at an early stage of the union. Finally,
in the presence of limits to transferability in spousal utility, reforms may aect the dissolution
rate, particularly for couples who were already together before the new laws were enacted.
However, the impact on partnerships formed after the legislative changes should be much
smaller.
In the second part of our paper, we turn to an empirical exploration of our model by
exploiting the legislative changes which granted the right to petition for alimony upon sepa-
ration for cohabiting couples in Canada. That these new laws were implemented at dierent
times in dierent provinces with dierent eligibility rules enables us to convincingly estimate
the causal eect of these rules. Furthermore, one can easily distinguish between couples
who started their relationships before and after the legislative changes. Our empirics thus
compare the causal estimates of granting alimony rights to partnerships already in existence,
when the new rules were implemented, with those that potentially reect how individuals
respond to these changes before entering a union.
Empirically, we estimate the impact of granting cohabiting couples the capacity to pe-
tition for alimony upon separation. Finding the impact of such a legislation is not easy as
there is an obvious endogeneity problem: regions that implement such a rule may be dis-
tinct from those that do not. Similarly, comparing couples who \register" their union with
2those who do not is not likely to lead to a causal eect, due to the obvious selection bias.
Furthermore, in the case of cohabiting couples, few countries have implemented rules with
variations which allow the construction of a credible \control group" for the estimation of a
causal impact (see Rangel, 2006, for a notable exception).
The context studied here is particularly interesting because not only were \common-
law spouses" | as cohabiting couples are called in Canada | granted alimony rights at
dierent time periods in dierent provinces, but also each province dened dierently the
length of cohabitation required to qualify for such rights. This provides a very rich source of
variation for our analysis in which we employ a triple-dierence strategy (based on province,
time and relationship duration) in order to identify the causal impact of the legal change.
Furthermore, many of these legal changes were implemented not in response to a demand
from cohabiting couples but as a way to oer homosexual couples | who, at that time, were
unable to legally marry | the same legal protection as their heterosexual counterparts, thus
diminishing the potential problem of endogenous adoption of the laws.
Using labor supply as a proxy for one's share of household resources (something that has
been employed previously but mostly in the context of married couples), we directly search
for evidence that alimony rights inuence spousal bargaining power. Alimony rights are likely
to benet women as they are rarely granted to men.1 The results we obtained here suggest
that, as cohabiting relationships were granted alimony rights, women were more likely to
attend school and stop working and less likely to work full-time whereas men became more
likely to work and less likely to study or have work interruptions. These results hold within
a given relationship over time, but they do not apply to individuals who were married, as
those already beneted from these rights and thus were unaected by the new laws. More
importantly, however, we nd contrasting outcomes for the new alimony rights' impact on
the behavior of cohabiting couples who entered a union after the alimony rights were granted:
among such couples, the impact of the law is limited and when observed, it is women | and
not men | who were less likely to study and to have fewer work interruptions, whereas they
were more likely to work or work full time.
Our results also suggest that the institution of alimony rights for cohabiting couples
led to longer periods of cohabitation but also that fewer of these unions eventually lead
to marriage. This appears to be only economically and statistically signicant for couples
who were matched before the legislative changes occurred, as we see no such eects among
couples who entered a cohabiting union after the new laws were introduced.
1Moreover, men are still more likely to be earning more than their companions, rendering it more likely
that transfers are made from men to women even when laws operate on the basis of `equitable distribution'
principles.
3These results contribute to our understanding of the dynamics between cohabitation
and marriage, a topic that has been mostly the focus of sociologists and demographers (see
Smock, 2000, for a review). Couples who marry after cohabitation have lower marriage
quality in terms of length of relationship, propensity to divorce, etc., although this does not
seem to be the case in most recent years (Schoen, 1992). And the only Canadian study
on the subject (White, 1987) reaches the opposite conclusion that cohabitation reduces the
probability of divorce upon marriage. Also, there are studies which document that children
who live in cohabiting households perform worse in most measures (see Manning, 1995, 2001).
Amador and Bernal (2008) attempt to correct for the obvious endogeneity problem in these
comparisons, but still nd that children with cohabiting parents have worse outcomes than
those with married parents in Colombia (despite the fact that both types of households have
the same rights there).
An empirical application of our main `marriage-market induced policy-neutrality' idea in
an economic development context is provided by Ambrus et al. (2010). They document that
mehr, a form of Islamic bride-price which functions as a prenuptial agreement in Bangladesh
due to the practice of it being only payable upon divorce, inuences dowries positively in
the marriage markets.
To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that has explored the impact of alimony
rights on cohabiting households is Rangel (2006), who also nds that such a rule decreased
female labor supply. He obtains a causal estimate of granting alimony rights to cohabiting
women in Brazil by using the fact that couples with children obtained such a right, but not
those without. The identication assumption we use here has the advantage of relying on a
much more similar control group through the use of a tripe-dierence estimator. Neverthe-
less, our key contribution lies in our empirics' capacity to estimate the eects of changing
spousal bargaining power in existing unions and comparing them with those in relationships
yet to be formed.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our theoretical framework;
Section 3 summarizes the legal setting; Section 4 covers our estimation methodology and the
data, while the subsequent section presents the empirical results. Our nal section then
concludes.
2Our results also mirror those obtained in the case of divorce laws in the United States (Peters, 1986,
Friedberg, 1998, Chiappori et al., 2002, and Wolfers, 2006).
42 The Model
We rst present a stylized model of the marriage market intended to illustrate why the impact
of granting alimony rights to couples should be dierent for couples already in a union at
the time of the legislative change than for couples who unite after the law is enacted. Our
model is based on a frictionless matching framework a la Becker-Shapley-Shubik; the reader
is refered to Browning et al. (in progress) for a general presentation. In the theory section,
we will not distinguish between marriage and cohabitation. And, often times, we shall use
the terms `husband' and `wife' loosely to refer to the man and the woman in a cohabitation
relationship, respectively. In the empirical work that follows, however, we shall distinguish
these two types of partnership based on how the law treats the alimony obligations in each
case. In particular, we shall explore whether there is any empirical evidence of this kind of
policy neutrality in the context of cohabiting partners in Canada. And, in our conclusion,
we'll have more to say on the distinctions between marriage versus cohabitation.
Our theoretical conclusions can be summarized as follows. A change in the rules governing
property rights over the distribution of family assets redistributes expected lifetime utilities
between spouses in exisiting couples. Regarding couples formed after the reform, in our
Beckerian framework (transferable utility both within and outside marriage), the change
has no impact on individual lifetime utilities at the time of marriage. Consequently, any
policy that raises the utility of women following divorce must reduce their total utility while
married.
2.1 Preferences
The economy is made up of individuals who live for two periods. They are characterized
by their income, y for men and z for women. In each period, they derive utility from
consumption of n private goods, q1;:::qn and N public goods Q1;:::;QN.3 Let p1;:::pn and
P 1;:::;P N denote the corresponding prices, with the normalization p1 = 1. Married people
also derive satisfaction from the quality of their match, : In order to remain within the
standard `Becker-Coase' framework, which relies on transferable utilities, we assume that
couples' preferences are of the generalized quasi-linear (GQL) form (see Bergstrom, 1989).











3The number of public and private goods need not be strictly greater than one. Our main conclusions go
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h;w; are positive, increasing, concave functions such that A(0) = 1 and Bm
i (0) = 0, and
good 1 is the `numeraire' that can be used to transfer utility between spouses at a constant
`exchange rate'.
Similarly, when single or after divorce, preferences take the strictly quasi-linear form:4
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i; i = h;w; are increasing concave functions, with Bs
i (0) = 0. By quasi-
linearity, none of the optimal levels of private and public consumption (except for good 1)
depend on income. Let the latter be denoted
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i ; i = h;w. Then,
the indirect utility of a single person equals his or her income.
If a man with income y is matched with a woman with income z; they can pool their
incomes. Given GQL preferences, utility is transferable between spouses. There is a unique
ecient level for the consumption of each of the public goods and each of the private goods
2 to n, and these levels depend only on the total income of the couple. The Pareto frontier


























+2  (t)+2; (3)
where t  y + z is the total family income while uh and uw are the attainable utility levels
that can be implemented by the allocations of the private good q1 between the two spouses,
given the ecient consumption levels of all other goods. Assuming, as is standard, that
the optimal public consumptions are such that A(Q) is increasing in Q, we see that (t) is
increasing and convex in t.5 It follows that the two individual traits (y and z) of a couple are
complements within the household. This generates positive economic gains from marriage
in the sense that the material output  (t) the partners generate together exceeds the sum of
4Both GQL preferences when married and quasi linear utilities when single are necessary to generate the
Becker-Coase benchmark in which, in a static context, divorce laws do not aect divorce probabilities; see
Clark (1999) and Chiappori, Iyigun, Weiss (2007).
Since one of our primary objectives is to explore if and when alimony divorce laws aect divorce rates, we
adopt these preference specications as our stringent benchmark. See Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2008)
for an example of a household model which generates a strictly linear Pareto frontier after divorce.
5By the envelope theorem, the derivative 0 (t) is equal to A(Q). Therefore,  is increasing in t and,
if A(Q) is increasing in t as well, then  is convex. Note that a sucient (but, by no means, necessary)
condition is that public consumptions are all normal.
6the outputs that the partners can obtain separately. Specically, the marital surplus  (t) t
rises with the total income of the partners, t.
For any couple, match quality  is drawn from a xed distribution  with a mean    0.
Upon union, both spouses expect to derive the same non-monetary utility from marriage,
 : At the end of the rst period, the match quality is revealed; a realized value of  that is
below the expected level   constitutes a negative surprise that may trigger legal separation.6
2.2 Family Decisions and Commitment
The decision variables for a couple in each period are the amounts of the public and private
goods that the couple purchases and the division of the `numeraire' private good between
them. At the beginning of each period, partners agree to buy the unique ecient levels of all
goods, namely the quantities which shift the linear utility Pareto frontier outward as much
as possible. There are no commitment issues involved here because (by construction) the
levels of consumption within a period cannot be changed and each spouse can predict that,
in the second period, consumption will be chosen at the unique and ecient level.7
Concerning the division of the numeraire good, however, there is a conict between the
two partners and the question is how it is resolved. As we shall show, in our frictionless
matching framework with continuous distributions of agents, competition at the time of
marriage fully determines the expected lifetime utility shares of the partners. However, in
the two period context discussed here, the share of the private good that each married spouse
receives can vary across time. The second-period division, which is anticipated when partners
choose to unite, depend on the assumption made on intrahousehold commitment. Since no
agreement has been reached so far in the theoretical literature, we shall consider here the
two polar cases. In the no-commitment case, the second period allocation is determined at
the beginning of the second period by some known mechanism (such as Nash Bargaining);
the marriage market clears based only on the exibility in the rst-period allocations, each
agent rationaly anticipating the second period outcomes. In the alternative, commitment
context, partners can sign binding contracts which determine allocations in both periods,
with the agreed-upon, second-period allocations being relevant only in marriage; however,
partners cannot commit not to divorce, and may choose to renegociate the second period
allocation by mutual agreement.
6One could incorporate random income shocks into our model. In that case, such shocks could trigger
divorce as well, but our qualitative conclusions would not be altered.
7One could also imagine that partners play a non-cooperative contribution game that ends up with lower
utility for both spouses. But given that the ecient level of Q can be easily implemented simply by buying
and consuming that quantity of the public good, such an assumption is hard to justify here.
72.3 Endowments
There exists a continuum of men and a continuum of women. The measure of men is
normalized to unity and the measure of women is denoted by r, where r R 1. Each man
receives an idiosyncratic income at the beginning of each period; their incomes, denoted y,
are distributed over the support [ym; yM], 0 < ym < yM, according to some distribution F.
Similarly, each woman gets an income z at the beginning of each period, and the z's are
distributed over the support [zm; zM], 0 < zm < zM according to the distribution G.
Following divorce, there can be income transfers (i.e., alimony payments) between the ex-
spouses. We assume that these transfers are fully determined by law and no further voluntary
transfers are made. Redistribution corresponds to a legal approach where property incomes
or spousal earnings are treated as a common resource and each spouse has some claim on
the income of the other. Specically, if a man with income y marries a woman with income
z; her income following divorce is z0 = (y + z) and his income is y0 = (1   )(y + z):
Thus the net income of a divorced person is generally dierent from what his or her income
would have been had he or she not married. The special case in which all incomes are
considered private, implying no redistribution via alimony payments, is represented by a 
that is couple-specic, namely   z
y+z .8
Income in our model can be interpreted as either labor or property income. For simplicity,
we do not allow savings or human capital investments during marriage so that both property
and human capital are constant. Given that we abstract from savings and the accumulation
of wealth or human capital, the distinction between the post-divorce division of property
and alimony payments is mostly semantic here. But one can interpret the variables y0 and
z0 as the stream of incomes generated from the (underlying) assets of the couple which
were redistributed according to the alimony laws that apply in legal separation (or divorce).
Generally, incomes depend on the saving, human capital investment and labor supply of
couples. Endogenizing these decisions in a matching model is complicated and we expect
the matching pattern and the policy implications to be broadly unaected. Therefore, the
basic model treats these choices as predetermined. However, in the empirical section we shall
explicitly address the eects of changes in the redistribution rules on education and labor
supply.9
8In essence, this means that the wife is granted an alimony payment equal to y   (1   )z upon legal
separation (or, in the case of marriage, divorce). And, analogously, the husband gets (1 )z   y following





9See also Mazzocco and Yamaguchi (2007) and Stevenson (2008).
82.4 The Marriage Market
In the rst period, all men and women wish to `marry' because the expected economic and
non-monetary gains from marriage are positive. For heuristic purposes, assume that r > 1,
so that some women remain single. As usual, we solve the model backwards, starting with
the legal separation (or, alternatively, the divorce) decision.
2.4.1 Stable Matches and Lifetime Utilities
Divorce At the end of the rst period, the true value of match quality is revealed and each
partner of a couple (y;z) can decide whether or not to stay together, based on the realization
of . Because utility is transferable, the Becker-Coase theorem applies and divorce occurs
whenever the total surplus generated outside the relationship is larger than what can be
achieved within it.10 Denoting total income of the partners by t = y + z, divorce occurs
whenever
 (t) + 2 < t ,  < ^ (t) =  
1
2
[ (t)   t] . (4)
In words, a union dissolves if the sum of the outside options, here t, exceeds  (t) + 2,
implying that reservation utilities are outside the Pareto frontier if the partnership continues.
On this basis, the ex-ante probability of divorce for a couple with endowments of y and z is
(t)  [^ (t)] : (5)
Note that the threshold ^ (t) decreases with the income of the couple, t, and consequently
the probability of divorce (t) declines.
The expected marital output (i.e. sum of utilities) generated over the two periods is
S (t) =  (t) + 2  + [1   (t)]
n
 (t) + 2E
h
 j   ^ (t)
io
+ (t)t . (6)
Note, rst, that S (t) > 2t; because  (t)  t and E
h
 j   ^ (t)
i
>    0. Thus, all
individuals prefer to get married rather than stay single. Secondly, S (t) is increasing in t,
hence in each partner's income. In particular, whenever women strictly outnumber men so
that r > 1, women belonging to the bottom part of the female income distribution remain
single. Finally, individuals sort positively into unions. Indeed, since the `marriage' surplus
only depends on total income t, the cross partial @2S=@y@z is equal to S00 (t). One can readily
10See Clark (1999) and Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2007) for detailed investigations of the transferability
in the presence of public goods.
9prove that S (t) is convex and therefore that the traits of the two partners are complements
even after the risk of divorce is taken into account.11
Matching: Who Marries Whom? Given the results of transferable utility and the
complementarity of individual incomes in generating surplus, a stable assignment must be
characterized by positive assortative matching. That is, if a man with an endowment y is
married to a woman with an endowment z, then the mass of men with endowments above y
must exactly equal the mass of women with endowments above z. This implies the following
spousal matching functions:
y = F






(1   F (y))

   (y): (7)
For r > 1, all men are married and women with incomes below z0 = G 1 (1   1=r) remain
single. Women with incomes exceeding z0 are then assigned to men according to  (y) which
indicates positive assortative matching.
Positive assortative matching has immediate implications for the analysis of divorce.
Because divorce is less likely when a couple has higher total income and individuals sort into
marriage based on income, individuals with higher income are less likely to divorce.12
Stability Conditions The allocations that support a stable assignment must be such that
the implied expected lifetime utilities of the partners satisfy
Uh(y) + Uw(z)  S(t) ; 8 y; z , (8)
where Uh(y) and Uw(z) respectively represent the expected lifetime utilities of the husband
and the wife over the two periods. For any stable marriage, equation (8) is satised as an
equality, whereas for a pair that is not married, (8) would be satised as an inequality. In
particular, we have
Uh (y) = max
z
[S (t)   Uw (z)] and Uw(z) = max
y
[S (t)   Uh (y)] . (9)
11See Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2008) for the complete proof.
12Such a result is consistent with empirical ndings on marriage and divorce patterns by schooling: indi-
viduals sort positively into marriage based on schooling and individuals with more schooling are less likely
to divorce. See Browning, Chiappori, Weiss (in progress, Ch. 1).
10It is important to note that the stability conditions above constrain the total (two-period)
expected utilities Uh and Uw, but have no implication for the intertemporal distribution of
utility over the two periods.
2.4.2 Determination of Expected Lifetime Utilities
General Characterization Equation (9) leads to an explicit characterization of the intra-




h (y) = S
0[y +   (y)] and Uw
0 (z) = S
0[(z) + z] . (10)
To derive the expected spousal allocations over the two periods and along the assortative
marital order, we integrate the expressions in (10). Hence, surplus share of a married man













w (x)dx , (11)
for some constants kh and kw which we determine below.
Pinning Down the Constants The constants kh and kw are pinned down by two con-














w (x)dx , (12)
where the left-hand side, by construction, does not depend on y. Secondly, it must be the
case that `the last married person' is just indierent between marriage and singlehood. In
the case with more women than men, r > 1; we have
Uw (z0) = 2z0 , k





w (x)dx , (13)














It is important to stress that the stability conditions apply without any assumption on
the level of commitment attainable by the spouses. The insight is that the conditions on
the marriage market determine the allocation of lifetime utilities between spouses: because
of competition, a wife would not agree to marry a husband who would provide less than the
equilibrium utility | since many perfect substitutes exist | and likewise for the husband.
2.5 The Intertemporal Allocations of Utility
2.5.1 The Commitment Issue
We continue our analysis with a consideration of the allocation of lifetime utilities Uh and
Uw between the two periods. At this point, commitment issues become crucial. While some
degree of commitment is clearly achievable, there may be limits on the extent to which
couples are able to commit | after all, couples could not and would not commit not to
divorce. Two broad views emerge from the existing literature. Some contributors argue
that only short-term commitment is attainable and that long-term decisions are generally
open to renegotiation at a further stage. Others authors point out that a set of instruments,
including prenuptial agreements, are available to sustain commitment. They, therefore, claim
that divorce is the only limitation on commitment. Technically, marriage contracts should
be seen as long-term ecient agreements under one constraint | namely that a person who
wants to divorce can always choose to do so.13
In our framework, these two alternative views about commitment have a natural trans-
lation. In the rst case (`commitment'), couples can commit to their spousal allocations in
both periods conditional on the continuation of their marriage; the corresponding contingent
allocations are ex-ante ecient under the sole constraint that divorce is unilateral. Therefore,
the only constraint on intra-temporal allocations is that second-period utility should exceed
singles' utility, at least insofar as divorce is not an ecient outcome. Finally, should an
unexpected event occur between the two periods, such as a reform of the alimony-payment
13As in standard contract theory, we assume in all cases that a minimal level of commitment, whereby
agents are able to at least commit to rst-period allocations when they get married, is attainable. See
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) for alternative assumptions. Also see Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Mazzocco
(2007) for further discussions of commitment issues within marriage.
12laws, this would not trigger a renegotiation of the initial agreement, unless the new indi-
vidual rationality constraint is violated for one spouse. In the latter case, such a spouse
would receive an additional share of household resources so that she becomes just indierent
between marriage and singlehood under the new law.14
In the alternative, polar case (`no commitment'), serious limits exist on the spouses'
ability to commit. In this case, couples may be able to commit to the immediate (i.e. rst
period) allocation of resources; but future allocations cannot be contracted upon and will
therefore be determined by a bargaining mechanism at the beginning of the second period.
This feature is known ex ante by the agents and it inuences the decisions regarding rst-
period allocations. Finally, if a reform occurs between the two periods, the new situation
is taken into account during second-period bargaining; i.e., bargaining always take place `in
the shadow of the law'.
2.5.2 Second-period Utilities
For illustrative purposes, consider the case in which couples can commit to their spousal
allocations in marriage ex ante; the no-commitment case can be solved in a similar way. No
renegotiation can therefore take place unless divorce is credible. Moreover, if renegotiation




w(z) denote the pecuniary components of utility derived from the intra-
marital allocations respectively of husband with endowment y and wife with endowment z in
the second period should they continue with their partnership. Hence, the husband's (wife's)
total second-period utility is u2
h (y) +  (resp. u2
w (z) + ) if the union continues. Feasibility
constraints require that u2
h (y) + u2
w (z) =  (t):
Under unilateral divorce, each spouse can walk away with the share of family income
determined by law, t for the wife and (1 )t for the husband, where t = (y +z) is family
income. Individual rationality implies that these outside options cannot exceed the utility
payos if the marriage continues. Therefore, it must be the case that
u
2
h (y) +   (1   )t and u
2
w (z) +   t; (15)
which we shall hereafter refer as the individual rationality constraints (IR). Note that these
14Such contracts are actually (second best) ecient under the constraint that agents cannot commit not
to divorce. Similar ideas are used in dierent contexts, in particular risk sharing agreements under limited
commitment. See Ligon et al. (2002) and Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2008).
13conditions jointly imply that
u
2
h (y) + u
2
w (z) + 2 =  (t) + 2  t , (16)
or equivalently that   ^ (t), so that divorce is not the ecient outcome.
Any allocation such that (15) is satised can be implemented as part of a feasible marital
contract:15
Proposition 1 With commitment and unilateral divorce, there exists exactly one allocation
that is not -contingent and guarantees that all the constraints are satised for any realization
of .
Proof. The key remark is that the individual rationality constraints (15) must be binding




h (y) = (1   )t   ^ (t) =
1
2
( (t) + (1   2)t); (17)
u
2
w (z) = t   ^ (t) =
1
2
( (t)   (1   2)t): (18)
Note that, for any realization of , either  < ^ (t) and divorce takes place or   ^ (t) and
utilities are equal to (1   )t +    ^ (t) and t +    ^ (t) for the husband and the wife
respectively, so that the time-consistency constraints are fullled for both spouses.
Interestingly, the second-period utilities in union exactly reect the utilities if separated,
with the addition of the dierence between the actual match quality  and the threshold ^ .16
In particular, we have






can be contingent upon the
realization of . Contingent allocations raise specic problems. For instance, depending on the enforcement
mechanism, they may require that the quality of the match be veriable by a third party. Whether such
veriability is an acceptable assumption is not clear. It turns out, however, that under our assumption of
common ; veriability is not an issue because there exists (exactly) one allocation allocation that satises
the incentive compatibility constraints for all :
16If, instead, one entertains the case in which couples cannot make pre-marital allocative commitments,
renegotiation would systematically take place at the beginning of the second period. If such couples reach
a Nash-bargaining solution, with the utility of the husband and the wife in case of divorce as the relevant
threat points, then the allocations will be such that they correspond exactly to the non -contingent alloca-
tions under commitment. In other words, the unique second-period allocation that is not -contingent and
guarantees that the individual rationality constraints are satised for any realization of  is also the Nash
solution to a second-period bargaining.
14Corollary 2 Any increase of a spouse's utility in divorce is exactly reected in that spouse's
second-period utility even if divorce does not take place.
2.5.3 First-period Utilities
For each choice of k, we can now recover the rst-period allocations. The expected two-period
utilities equal
Uh (y) = u
1




h (y) + E
h
 j   ^ (t)
io
+ (t)(1   )t , (19)
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+ (t)t , (20)
where (t) = Pr

 < ^ 

is the separation (or divorce) probability. These utilities must
coincide with the equilibrium values derived above. Therefore, for r > 1,
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2.6 Reforming Alimony Laws
Consider now a change in alimony payment laws that raises the wives' share of household
income from  to ^ . This, of course, does not rule out the possibility that 's may be couple-
specic (as it would be in a private-property regime). As long as utility is transferable, the
Becker-Coase theorem applies and such a change does not aect divorce probabilities. In
particular, the threshold ^ (t) only depends on the surplus generated by a union, not on
its post-divorce division between (ex-) spouses; a couple splits if and only if its realized
 lies below the threshold, irrespective of the  in place. But, under unilateral divorce
laws, changes in  typically result in a redistribution of the surplus between spouses during
marriage. Whether a wife would benet from the new property division rules would depend
on her income, her marriage match quality and the level of commitment achieved between
the spouses.
Concerning the impact on the division of marital gains, it is crucial to distinguish between
existing couples, who are together when the change becomes eective, and future couples,
15who are not. For the former, unexpected legislative changes may trigger a renegotiation
within the household and alter the original contract implemented. For the latter, the new
legislation would be taken into account at the matching stage and reected in the expected
allocations entering marriage. We now consider these two cases successively.
2.6.1 Existing Couples
Consider a couple with endowments y and z for the husband and wife, respectively, whose
match quality  strictly exceeds the threshold ^ (t). Since the intra-household allocations, as
determined in the marriage market, were individually rational, it must have been the case
that neither spouse had an incentive to get divorced with the original  in place.
Assume, rst, that the spouses feel committed by the contract they initially chose, although
they do not feel obligated to remain together. If  is large enough, the wife's individual
rationality requirements given by (15) are satised for both  and ^ . This occurs if   ^ t 
u2
w (z);where u2
w (z) denotes the continuation utility of the wife under the current agreement.
Then, due to commitment, the change in divorce laws has no impact on intra-household
allocations. If, on the contrary,  is such that ^ t   u2
w (z) >   t   u2
w (z),then the initial
agreement is no longer enforceable, since it would violate the wife's individual rationality.
Hence, her second-period allocation must be adjusted upward to ^ u2
w (z) = ^ t   , which
requires an additional transfer equal to
T =

^    

t     
 (t)   t
2
 0 . (21)
From a comparative perspective, the probability of a renegotiation taking place depends
on the distribution of . In the benchmark case where  is more or less uniform over a
`large enough' support, the probability is proportional to

^    

t. When both  and ^ 
are identical across couples, the reform aects a larger proportion of higher-income couples.
We conclude that the reform will aect intra-household allocations of some | but not all |
couples. For couples with a low realized match quality, the second-period marital allocation
of the wife may no longer be sustainable. As a result, there will be more recontracting in
favor of women among such couples. And since rst-period spousal allocations would have
already been sunk for all of the existing unions at the time of the legislative change, a more
generous settlement rule for the wives would imply higher allocations for them in the second
period and over their lifetimes.
Finally, in the absence of commitment, the conclusions are identical except for one aspect
- namely, that renegotiation takes place between all spouses, because the reform directly
16impacts the respective threat points of all couples, even the wealthy and happy ones.
2.6.2 Future Couples
Now consider a couple who is not yet together at the time of the legal change in alimony
laws. The expected lifetime allocations of such a couple, as given by equations (19) and
(20), can be decomposed into three parts: rst-period utility, second-period utility if the
union is continued, and second-period utility in case of legal separation. Unlike existing
unions, however, this eect is fully anticipated by the agents in the matching phase and
reected in equilibrium allocations. This has two consequences. First, the reform inuences
intra-household allocation in both periods. This is because the allocations of lifetime utility,
which involves rst- and second-period welfare, is decided during the matching process,
taking into account the new law. A second and more subtle implication is that the impact
of the reform on a future union is the same whether or not agents are able to commit to
specic intra-household allocations ex ante. Indeed, we have seen in subsection 2.5.2 that
the (non--contingent) allocation decided ex ante is the same in both contexts.
Using (17) and (18), we can compute the impact of a change in post-divorce allocations
















^    

t. (22)
Hence, a divorce law that mandates more generous divorce settlements for women in-
creases their utility in the second period whether or not the couple separates. However,
the reform also lowers their rst-period allocations by the same amount. Implicit in the
above argument is what we have already established: in unions not yet formed, a legisla-
tive change has no eect on the expected lifetime allocations. But given that equilibrium
spousal allocations need to be individually rational, more favorable divorce rules may lead
to a more rapidly rising allocation path for the wives-to-be in order to ensure that their
marital commitments are time consistent; in practice, they get more at the end, therefore
less at the beginning of the union. In particular, all wives' expected intra-marital allocations
conditional on remaining married are reduced and the reduction exactly osets their gain in
case of divorce.
Proposition 3 A change in the rules governing property rights over the distribution of
family assets has no impact on welfare as measured by expected lifetime utilities at the time
of marriage. To the extent that the policy raises the utility of women following divorce, it
must reduce their total utility while married.
17These neutrality results relate to the literature on Ricardian equivalence (see Barro, 1974)
in that an attempt by the government to redistribute income among agents is completely
undone by a redistribution over time within family units. The neutrality of mandated divorce
settlements is also similar to Lazear's (1990) result on the neutrality of mandated severance
payments in the context of worker-rm relationships. In both cases, an attempt by the
government to redistribute income among agents is completely undone by a redistribution
over time within families or rms and does not aect the competitive outcome.17 This point
is also made by Lundberg and Pollak (1993) regarding child allowances.
3 Alimony Rights of Cohabiting Partners in Canada
In Canada, the rights of cohabiting individuals in case of separation have changed dramati-
cally over the last 35 years, mirroring the pattern of other nations. However, what sets the
Canadian provinces apart from most European nations is that no \registration" of unions
is required. Cohabitation, in itself, is the proof required by law for demonstrating one's
commitment to the relationship.
Table 1 presents a summary of the legislative changes studied in this paper. These
laws only granted spouses the right to petition for alimony upon separation. They did not
grant rights to an equal division of assets, which is still, in most jurisdictions, granted to
married individuals.18 The legislative shifts analyzed here occurred between 1978 (in the
province of Ontario) and 2000 (in Newfoundland). There appears to be no general trend for
provinces close to one another to have coordinated their legislation. It also does not appear
that provinces that were more liberal or with a higher proportion of common-law spouses
adopted these legislations earlier than others. Actually, the province with the most common-
law relationships (Quebec) is the only province that has continued not to oer any protection
to partners in that form of unions.19 Furthermore, most of the shifts were brought upon by
cases in provincial and national courts. The majority of recent changes in legislation was
due to cases involving homosexual couples rather than heterosexuals, who were then granted
these benets on the grounds of equality. This should reduce the potential for endogeneity
17Note, however, that our result relies on market forces rather than altruism to endogenize redistribution
between spouses.
18Asset division was granted to common-law spouses in 2001 in Saskatchewan. We have excluded from
our analysis the territories where, in general, spousal benets and asset division rights were granted simul-
taneously.
19In July 2009, the Quebec Superior Court ruled that such a law was constitutional and allowed Quebec
to continue with this policy in a case involving a famous tycoon and his cohabiting partner of many years
who was seeking monthly alimony payments of CAN$56,000 in addition to a payout of CAN$50 million. In
December 2010, the case was sent to the Supreme Court.
18according to changes in cohabiting couples' behavior.
What provides yet more source of variation for identication is that, as shown in Table
1, each geographical entity diered greatly on how they dened a common-law relationship.
The required duration of cohabitation ranges from one year in Nova Scotia to ve years in
Manitoba. Also, six provinces reduced the requirement in terms of cohabitation length for
couples with children.
How are these laws enforced? It appears that it is left to the petitioner to prove that
the relationship lasted the required amount of time. Evidence such as common leases, bank
accounts are useful in this matter. However, since 1993, this is facilitated by a change in the
federal tax code. As of that date, common-law partners having lived together for more than
12 months (or less but with a child) must le their income taxes jointly. This shift aected
all couples in all provinces at the same time.
One also needs to mention that, in all provinces, cohabitation agreements are legal and
could be signed upon entry into cohabitation and stipulate the nancial exchanges that
would be accepted if separation ever occurs. These were not invalidated by the changes in
the law. However, the courts have a record of refusing to enforce agreements that are judged
to be \unfair". Furthermore, such cohabitation agreements are actually rarely signed by
partners.
Finally, cohabitation in Canada is not uncommon and rising in popularity. According
to Statistics Canada (2001), 16 percent of all couples were cohabiting. This is driven by
the very large number of common-law unions in Quebec (where 30 percent of all unions are
cohabitations) but the proportion of common-law relationships in the rest of Canada in 2001
(11.7) is still larger than that in the United States (8.2). Common-law relationships dier
observationally from legal unions in many ways: they are shorter-lived, have lower fertility
rates, involve younger, French-speaking and slightly more educated partner. For further
details, see Statistics Canada (2001).
4 Estimation Framework and Data
The structure of the law discussed above seems to suggest the use of a Dierence-in-
Dierence-in-Dierences (DDD) estimator since whether a relationship was subject to the
law depended on 3 distinct components: the year in which the relationship started, the
duration of the relationship and the province where the relationship was occurring. The
special rules for parents also imply a 3-component variation: the year when the relationship
started, when the child was born and in which province determined whether the relationship
19was under the inuence of the new law. We now describe in detail the empirical strategy
pursued and the data used in order to operationalize this identication strategy.
4.1 The Estimation Equation
We want to use the legislative framework presented above to estimate the impact of granting
cohabiting partners the right to petition for alimony on an outcome yiptcjj for an individual
i, in province p, whose relationship began in year t observed in year j. Let cj be equal to
1 if the couple has had a child by year j. For each province, dene the year in which the
new law is implemented as Tp, the required duration as Dp and an indicator for shortened
duration when children are involved as Cp.
Dene the variable Aptdcjj as an indicator of whether the relationship was, in year j,




1(p = k)  1(j > Tk)  1(1(j   t > Dk) + cj  Ck) (23)
where 1(:) represents the indicator function. In each case, a couple is eligible if the rela-
tionship is still active at the time of the legal change and if it lasted more than the required
amount of time or if it had a child by that time (since all provinces with special rules for
children impose a relationship duration of at most one year, we will judge the presence of a
child to be sucient in itself).
Formally, this triple dierence strategy translates into a regression equation which is
given by:
yiptcjj = Aptcjj + Xij +
10 X
k=1
k1(p = k)  1(j > Tk) +
10 X
k=1




k1(p = k)  cj  Ck +
10 X
k=1
k1(j > Tk)  1(j   t > Dk) +
10 X
k=1




k1(j > Tk) +
10 X
k=1
k1(j   t > Dk) +
10 X
k=1
k  cj  Ck + j + i + "iptcjj
(24)
In (24),  represents the causal estimate of granting cohabiting couples the right to peti-
tion for alimony. To control for other individual-specic characteristics that could inuence
20y, individual controls Xij for the age and the square of the age will be added. In order
to allow for serial correlation, standard errors are clustered at the province level. Further-
more, in order to alleviate the problem of selective migration by which individuals may be
moving to a particular province in response to the changes in the law, we shall assume that
individuals were subject to the legislative changes in their province of birth.20 And while
a more complete set of interactions may have been ideal, the sample size at hand for this
study is too small to allow for more detailed interactions between province, year of formation
and duration.21 Finally, many relationships are short-lived and the impact of alimony rights
would likely impact both individuals still in a relationship and those who are not. In order
to allow for this eect to be captured, we include the full length of the relationship or the
rst ten years after the beginning of the relationship for those that lasted shorter.
The required identifying assumption here is that there was no other contemporaneous
shock aecting cohabiting couples who were living together for more than a certain period
in provinces where the legislation was changed. This is robust to shocks occurring in a
province at a given time or to couples with longer durations in a particular province being
dierent than those in another one. Furthermore, as we specied above, in most of the
recent legislative changes, the impetus for modifying the law was not a desire to modify the
legal rights of cohabiting partners but more of a need to oer homosexual couples (who,
at that time, were not allowed to marry legally) the same type of legal protection married
heterosexual couples were aorded in case of separation.
Our objective is to contrast the parameter  when estimated for couples who were formed
before the new legal framework and for those formed after. In the rst case, we estimate the
equation (24) restricting the sample to relationships that began before they could modify
their behavior and avoid becoming subject to the new ruling (that is where t < Tp   Dp for
each province). In those regressions, the duration of the relationship j   t is censored to
the length of the relationship before the law changed so as to ignore potential endogenous
responses to be included into the estimation. Furthermore, because of the way the sample is
selected, all relationships that are still active when the law changes are by denition having
lasted long enough to be subject to the alimony rules, which prevents the inclusion of the
parameters k in the estimation equation above.
We will estimate this equation to measure the impact of granting alimony rights to new
couples by restricting the sample to new couples and those couples formed before the law
20Also, only 2 cross province migration episodes are recorded which, in some cases, prevent us from tracking
where individuals lived when they were cohabiting. About 80 percent of the sample lives in the province
where they were born.
21We will estimate  interacted by gender, and all terms will be interacted with a gender dummy, except
for the year xed eects, which was too costly in terms of degrees of freedom.
21while they were not eligible (if they ever became so).
Finally, we also restrict the sample only to new relationships and use a dierence-in-
dierence model using the province and the duration of the relationship as the only variables
determining treatment. In this case, the identifying assumption is that there were no other
province-specic shocks that aect relationships lasting more than a given number of years.
Those regressions will be estimated in a similar way to (24), except most controls will not
be included, and standard errors will also be clustered by province.
In some instances, we will not be looking at changes in behavior over the duration of
a relationship but rather an outcome specic to the full relationship (such as whether the
relationship became a marriage). In those instances, we only observe one instance in the
relationship and will thus not be able to use relationship xed eects. Equation (24) is then
modied where j   t is xed to the relationship duration and cj to an indicator of whether
the couple ever had a child and relationship xed eects are replaced with province xed
eects. In this case as well, the same three samples are used as described previously to allow
a contrast between relationships formed before and after the legal change.
4.2 The Data
In our empirical work, we use the General Social Survey (GSS) data of 2001, from Statistics
Canada. This is a survey that was performed once, but it asked very detailed retrospective
questions on one's education, labor market activities, children and past relationships. The
total sample was 24,310 Canadians aged 15 and above in all provinces but not in the terri-
tories. The survey is also retrospective and thus subject to recall bias. Nevertheless, as long
as this bias is not altered by the new alimony rules, it should not aect our results.
The data collected from the GSS measure all the characteristics needed to classify a union
as subject to the new alimony rules or not: the age at which the relationship began (which,
taken together with the year of birth, identies the year in which the relationship began),
the age at which it ended (or whether it was still active at the moment of the survey) and the
province of birth. The variable A is computed using this information for each relationship,
as well as all the ingredients required as control variables in equation (24).
Our key outcomes of interest relate to the measures of relative welfare of each partner.
As is common in this literature, we use labor supply as a proxy for the consumption of
leisure and thus higher labor supply will be assumed to imply lower welfare. The GSS
does not provide information regarding the number of hours or weeks worked. Instead, the
22respondents were asked to detail their full retrospective histories of work and education.22
Periods of work, hiatus and education are then matched to each relationship based on the
years of each event. The survey only provides limited information on the spouses for each of
the relationships detailed by the respondents. The data available include the age dierence
between the respondent and his/her partner as well as the marital status of the partner
before the relationship.23
The data also provide a variety of outcomes to measure the impact of the legislation
on relationship stability. First, one can determine whether the cohabitation eventually led
to marriage (which can be seen as a substitute for cohabitation). The data also allow us
to measure the overall duration of the relationship (including the years of marriage when
relevant) and whether or not the relationship had ended at the time of the 2001 survey.
We do not use the full GSS sample. Immigrants and individuals born in the territories
are excluded since their province of birth is outside the sample. Relationships that began
before 1960 are also excluded so as to focus on relationships that are closer in timing to the
legislative changes observed. This gives a sample of 7,520 common-law relationships and
11,279 marriages.
Summary statistics of the main variables of interest are presented in Table 2 for both
marital and common-law relationships. In this table, every relationship is one observation
and the summary statistics are computed using the person-specic weights provided by the
survey. The rst section documents the demographic characteristics of the respondents.
Respondents in common-law relationships dier from those in legal unions in many ways:
they are more likely to be French-speaking; Catholics or atheists; less likely to have attended
religious services as teens; more likely to have a high school diploma but less likely to have a
college degree. They are also much shorter-lived (16 versus 8 years) even after we take stock
of the entire relationship (cohabitation plus eventual marriage). Partners were also more
likely to have larger dierences in age in cohabitation than in marriage. About 37 percent
of the common-law relationships in the sample eventually led to marriages and about 45
percent of the couples were separated by 2001. Couples formed before and after the law
22All work episodes are described including the year they began, the year they ended and whether they
involved mostly full-time or part-time work. All interruptions, which are dened as periods of more than
3 months where the individual was not working for a variety of reasons, including lack of work, sickness,
maternity/paternity leaves, retirement, job switches, etc, are also mentioned as well as any educational
experience. Maternity and paternity leaves are also compiled.
23Only for the current partner is more information gathered but there is a severe selection bias which
prevents us from using these data. Also, most of the rst generation of laws only applied to couples of the
opposite sex. The data do not allow us to identify whether previous partners were of the opposite sex so all
relationships in the dataset are treated as being heterosexual and thus subject to the law. Information on
current partners, in any case, indicates that less than one percent of current cohabitation relationships are
homosexual and thus the measurement error induced by this assumption appears to be minimal.
23change dier in some respects, most of which are driven by the fact that the latter started
later and exclude all Quebecers.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for our panel regressions where each observation
is a year-relationship. The rst set of statistics includes all years where the relationship
is active while the second includes at least 10 years for all relationships, as justied in
the previous section. In both samples, about 11-12 percent of years included one where
an individual studied, about three-quarters included work and about two-thirds, full time.
Around 12-13 percent included a work interruption and, while about 5 percent of years
involved a maternity leave, a much smaller fraction included paternity leaves.
5 The Impact of Granting Alimony Rights
5.1 Alimony Rights and Labor Supply
Alimony payments are usually made from the higher-earning partner to the lower-earning
one. Since over the period in question, men were still more likely to earn higher incomes than
their spouses, we assume that legally requiring alimony payments favored females. Thus, we
expect that, when a relationship becomes eligible for these rules, female partners decrease
their labor supply provided that leisure is a normal good. This section explores changes in
spousal labor supply using these various outcome measures as proxies for labor supply.
The results of the estimation of equation (24), using the three samples detailed above,
are presented in Table 4. Panel A focuses on couples formed before a legislative change,
while those for all unions except those that were immediately subject to the new laws when
the changes were enacted are found in Panel B. Panel C shows the results of a simple
dierence-in-dierence regression focusing only on couples formed after the legislation had
been passed.
The results imply that, when a relationship is granted the right to petition for alimony,
women are about 4.7 percent less likely to work full time and 2 percent more likely to be
studying. They are also 5.3 percent more likely to have stopped working. Their likelihood of
having taken maternity leave increases by 2.4 percent (although not statistically so) even if
the probability of having a child is unchanged.24 Males, on the other hand, responded to the
legislation in a statistically dierent manner. They appear to have reduced their likelihood
of being in school and having suered work interruptions but more likely to have worked,
particularly full-time. They appear to have been less likely to take paternity leave but this
24Results on fertility are not presented but available upon request.
24result is very small in magnitude and not signicant.
What is much more striking is the dierence between Panel A and the following two panels
of the table. Once one measures the impact of a relationship being subject to alimony rules
on relationships formed after the legal change, the conclusions are very much dierent. This
is true both in Panel B and C, despite the dierence in the estimation strategy in these two
samples. The coecients are usually smaller in magnitude for couples formed after the legal
change and of the opposite signs as the ones presented in Panel A. These results appear
to suggest that relationships formed after the \rules of the game" were changed responded
very dierently to being subject to the alimony rules than those that were formed before
such a legal change, and in a way that is perfectly consistent with the theoretical framework
presented above. The bottom of the table presents a formal test of the equality of the
coecients. We can reject that the two sets of coecients are equal for work interruptions
and full timework (in both panels) and for work and maternity when compared with Panel
B.
These ndings are explored in more detail in the subsequent table where various robust-
ness checks are performed. We, in particular, investigate the robustness of three outcomes:
whether the individual studied in a given year; whether the individual worked full time;
and whether the respondent had work interruptions. In the rst column, the results are
presented assuming that no exceptions are made for relationships with children and that the
alimony rights are granted solely on the basis of the duration of cohabitation. The estimates
are fairly consistent with those presented in Table 4. The next column uses all years when
the relationship was active and thus excludes years after a short relationship terminated.
Doing so alters the results but more in signicance than in magnitudes. This highlights
the importance of having a comparison point for relationships that lasted longer which is
impossible if we use only the active relationships in the sample. The next two columns com-
pare the results restricting the sample to either older relationships, in column (3), or more
recent ones, in column (4). Overall, the measured impact appears to be larger and more
signicant when focusing on recent legal changes than older ones even if some signicant
impacts are measured for working full-time in the older sample. The next column excludes
all relationships from Quebec which shrinks the sample by almost half. The results on the
probability of studying or suering a work interruption lose their signicance but the results
on labor supply are much larger and more signicant than previously. Column (6) repeats
the exercise, but this time using married individuals as a placebo group. The coecients in
this case are much smaller in magnitude and rarely signicant. When they are (as in the case
of work interruptions) they are of the opposite sign for cohabitations. Thus, this suggests
that the results obtained in the previous table are not driven by events contemporaneous
25to the legislative changes aecting all types of unions in a geographical location. The last
column includes controls for forthcoming legislative changes. In all outcomes, the fact that
an individual would become subject to alimony rights in 2 years has no signicant eect on
his or her contemporary labor supply. Furthermore, except in the case of work interruptions,
the introduction of such an additional control does little to change the size and signicance
of the coecients of interest.
Table 6 then explores who is more likely to respond to these new rules concerning alimony.
The same three outcomes as in the previous table are presented and results are fairly similar
for other outcomes. The odd columns present the coecients of the main eect of the law,
and the even ones, the interaction term between the legislative change and a dummy for
the respondent being male. The theoretical framework suggests that an individual with a
higher income would be more likely to respond to the policy change if there exists some
capacity to commit to allocations. While the data do not oer information regarding the
income of the respondent at the time of the relationship, we use two proxies: the education
level and the age at which the relationship began. The rst panel contrasts the treatment
eect by the education level of the respondent. In the case of whether the respondent
worked full-time in a given year, the legislative change appears to have aected more directly
individuals with higher levels of education, as predicted by the model. While men with more
education responded more strongly to the legislation in terms of work interruptions and
studies (although not signicantly so), it is women with lower levels of education who did so
for work interruptions and women with a high school degree who did so for studying. It does
appear that couples formed before age 21 responded less in terms of labor supply but more
in terms of schooling. But, overall, there is no strong dierence between individuals who
were in their 20s at the beginning of the relationship and those who were older. Although
not shown, we also demonstrate that most of the impact appears to inuence couples who
have been in a relationship for the longest period before the legal change, except in the case
of education where it is most visible for more recently united couples.
So far, we assumed that women are the lower earning spouses and thus would be the
ones benetting from alimony payments. However, there are couples for whom this was
not the case. While we have no information on the relative income of partners, we can
use a crude proxy given by their age dierence. Those results are presented in the bottom
panel of Table 6. The results are strongly in agreement with the hypothesis that the older
spouse would be the one responsible for making alimony payments. The results we have
found earlier appear to be concentrated among couples for whom the women was at least 5
years younger, thus making them more likely to obtain alimony in case of separation.25 On
25This group represents about 25 percent of all relationships.
26the other hand, results are of the opposite sign (although rarely signicant except for the
probability of studying) when women were much older than their partners, which is again
consistent with the hypothesis that the older partner was more likely to be the one making
the alimony payments.
Although the model clearly justies the results obtained in Table 4, it also suggests
that women who enter cohabitation after the legal changes would need to compensate their
partners for the obtention of these new rights, in particular during the earlier part of a
relationship. This is explored in Table 7 where the sample is the same as that in Panel
B of Table 4: that is, all year-couple observations of a relationship (including at least 10
years following the beginning of a relationship if the relationship does not last long) but
where relationships that were \caught" by the change in law are truncated at that point.
The rst panel simply compares the labor force participation of women and men contrasting
relationships formed before and after the legal change. While the statistical signicance of
the results are limited, the pattern suggested is clearly in harmony with our model: women
who enter common-law relationships after the legal change are more likely to work and less
likely to study or have work interruptions. The dierence in the probability of having a
work interruption is of about 7 percent. Panel B explores this pattern more carefully by
interacting whether the relationship started before or after the passing of the law with a
linear indicator for the number of years since the relationship began. As years go by, women
in the new regime should be able to benet from alimony payments, either because the
relationship ends at some point or because it stays active and she receives the payo she was
anticipating within the relationship, which is higher under the new law due to its eect on the
intertemporal path of allocations (as in Corollary 2). This is exactly what the results in the
bottom panel indicate. We now see that, at the beginning of a relationship, men were more
likely to study and less likely to work after the new rules were implemented. Women were less
likely to suer work interruptions. However, with the passage of time, the pattern is reversed
as men's labor force participation changes little and that of women decreases. The results
are particularly marked for work interruptions where the probability of experiencing a work
interruption would eventually favor women 11 years after the beginning of the relationship.
5.2 Alimony Rights and Relationship Stability
We have shown in our theoretical section that, when utility is transferable, the `Becker-Coase'
theorem applies resulting in no change in divorce likelihoods following changes in alimony
laws. However, this might not be the case when utility is not fully transferable. Hence, we
investigate here whether granting alimony rights to relationships change the duration and
27the stability of those relationships. This closely relates to the debate surrounding the impact
of no-fault divorce laws on the incidence of divorce in the United States (see, for example,
Wolfers, 2006). The threat of separation may be sucient to alter the way the bargaining
power is at play within the relationship but this threat may need to be exercised in some
cases when there are frictions in making compensating spousal transfers within the union.
We consider four related outcomes here. First, many cohabitation relationships eventually
lead to a formal marriage. However, if cohabitation starts to resemble more traditional legal
unions in the eyes of the law, there are less incentives for such a transformation. One may
thus expect that granting alimony rights to cohabiting couples may lead fewer of them to
\tie the knot". Granting alimony rights also changes the \outside option" of each partner,
making it more costly for one and less costly for the other. The overall impact of these rules
on the stability of the union is, thus, unclear. We use whether the relationship was still alive
at the time of the survey and the length of the cohabitation as our measures of stability. Since
there is a potential trade-o with marriage, the total length of the relationship (including
any subsequent marriage when relevant) is also included as an outcome.
Table 8 presents the results for these measures. The top panel includes the results for
unions formed before the laws were enacted, while Panel B presents those for unions except
those that immediately became subject to the new laws once the laws were adopted and Panel
C presents the results of a simple dierence-in-dierence among unions formed after the legal
change. The even columns represent the results when males and females are pooled, and the
odd columns, one where all control variables as well as the treatment variable are interacted
with a dummy for the respondent being male. The results suggest that the Becker-Coase
theorem cannot be rejected in this sample: the likelihood of a couple being separated at the
time of the survey in 2002 does not seem to be signicantly related to the fact that the union
became subject to alimony rights, at least in the case of existing couples. Similarly, being
granted alimony rights does not appear to have changed the overall duration of relationships
for couples formed before the legal change. However, it does appear to have signicantly
increased the duration of the cohabitation phase of the relationship by about 2 years and
reduced the likelihood of transforming them into marriage by about 14 percent. There is
little indication that these impacts diered between male and female respondents. On the
other hand, for unions that formed after the laws were changed, being eligible for alimony
payments appears to have shortened the duration of cohabitation (and maybe even of the
overall duration of the relationship, depending on the estimation strategy used). For none of
the outcomes is the impact of being granted alimony rights among all relationships similar
in size to the estimated impact in Panel A.
28We then evaluated how robust these results are to some variations.26 Six dierent tests
were performed mirroring those of Table 5. First, only rules regarding whether the rela-
tionship lasted the required number of years were used, ignoring the exceptions linked to
the presence of children. The results were similar in magnitude in signicance to the ones
presented in Table 8. We then added a number of covariates including the mother tongue,
religious background and educational attainment of the respondent. The results, once more,
were unaltered by this modication. Next, we explored whether restricting the sample to
relationships formed early or late inuenced the estimates. When focusing on relationships
that began before 1990, we found that granting alimony rights not only lengthened the co-
habitation but increased its stability, making it less likely to be over by 2001 and increasing
its overall duration by about 1.7 years | a little less than half of the increase in cohabitation
length. On the other hand, relationships formed after 1980 displayed a similar pattern as
the one highlighted for the entire sample. This could be simply due to the fact that recent
relationships were more likely to be censored and, thus, less likely to signicantly demon-
strate an impact on long-lasting measures such as relationship stability. We repeated the
estimation this time excluding all relationships from Quebec. In this sample, the Becker-
Coase theorem appeared to be violated again, as relationships that became subject to the
alimony rights were 13 percent less likely to have ceased to exist at the time of the survey
and would have lasted about 2.6 more years in total. Cohabitation length increased more
signicantly in this sample but the likelihood of it evolving into a marriage was not changed.
Finally, we also introduced a lagged indicator which was equal to one if the couple was to
become subject to alimony rules in 2 years. Comfortingly, the coecient of that dummy
variable was small and insignicant (except in the case of overall duration), suggesting that
the results presented in the previous table were not simply capturing a time trend. Finally,
we also used log duration as an outcome variable because of the likely problem of censoring
in that variable and the results remained identical to the ones presented above.
As a nal exercise, we explored whether these laws dierentially aected individuals with
distinct attributes. We found that the likelihood that a relationship was inactive by 2001
appears to have been inuenced by the alimony rights more strongly for individuals with less
education, those who started the relationship at an older age and those for whom the woman
was much older than her partner.27 In no subgroup was the total duration of the relationship
signicantly impacted by the legal change. However, the two variables that were signicantly
modied by the granting of alimony rights for the entire sample, the likelihood of eventual
marriage and the duration of the cohabitation, did appear to respond more strongly in those
26All estimates discussed but not shown are available upon request.
27Several studies have found that early marriages and of uneducated partners tend to be less stable. See,
for instance, Weiss and Willis (1997).
29groups where the labor supply responses were more visible | that is, individuals with more
education, older couples and those where the man was much older than his partner.
6 Conclusions
We advanced in this paper a collective intra-household allocation model that incorporates
both the process of spousal matching and the prospect of divorce. Doing so, we found
elements of policy neutrality, as we identied that changes in alimony laws would aect
existing couples and couples-to-be dierently.
We then provided some empirical evidence from Canada, using dierential rules in distinct
Canadian provinces and the fact that those were phased out at dierent moments over the last
35 years. We found that being oered alimony rights led females to increase their likelihood
of attending school and experiencing work interruptions and decreasing their likelihood of
working full-time. Males, on the other hand, experienced the opposite pattern once they
became subject to the new legislation. All the more important, we also identied contrasting
outcomes for the new alimony rights' impact on the behavior of cohabiting couples who got
together after the alimony rights were granted: among such couples, men | and not women
| were more likely to study, have more work interruptions, whereas they were less likely to
work or work full time.
In a context where, all around the world, many couples choose to cohabitate before or
in lieu of marriage, the issues we have explored here appear to be more and more relevant.
Our results suggest that while government intervention in this \market" may have short-run
impact on existing couples, they are unlikely to be able to alter outcomes more than a simple
inter-temporal shift.
Furthermore, our results may also explain the limited number of cohabitation arrange-
ments signed, even when they are legal and likely to be enforced, mirroring the limited
number of pre-nuptial agreements (see Weiss and Willis (1993)). The theoretical framework
presented highlights that they may only be able to inuence the inter-temporal allocation
resources, while the expected utility is driven by market forces.
Finally, while our results indicate that more couples subject to these rules were likely
to remain in a cohabitation union and not transform it into a marriage, our theoretical
framework does not model the choice of marriage versus cohabitation. This is left to future
work.
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7 Tables and gures
Table 1: Summary of legislations granting alimony rights to cohabiting couples
Province Legislation Year Length required Special cases
Newfoundland Family Law Act 2000 2 years 1 yr with child
PEI Family Law Act 1995 3 years 1 yr with child
Nova Scotia Maintenance and Custody Act 1989 1 year
New Brunswick Family Services Act 1980 3 years
Quebec No law
Ontario Family Law Act 1978 3 years Auto. with child
Manitoba Family Maintenance Act 1983 5 years 1 yr with child
Saskatchewan Family Maintenance Act 1990 3 years Auto. with child
Alberta Domestic Relations Act 1999 3 years 1 yr with child
British Columbia Family Relations Act 1979 2 years
33Table 2: Summary statistics (cross-section sample)
Cohabitations Marriages
before the law after the law all
N mean st.d. N mean st.d. N mean st.d.
Demographic characteristics
Age relationship began 4025 25.98 8.46 3495 27.17 8.72 11279 26.18 7.69
Male 4025 0.47 0.50 3495 0.48 0.50 11279 0.48 0.50
English-speaking 4020 0.28 0.45 3484 0.88 0.32 11235 0.68 0.47
French-speaking 4020 0.70 0.46 3484 0.07 0.25 11235 0.26 0.44
Catholic 4001 0.70 0.46 3436 0.27 0.44 11077 0.44 0.50
Atheist 4001 0.13 0.34 3436 0.35 0.48 11077 0.15 0.36
Protestant 4001 0.14 0.35 3436 0.35 0.48 11077 0.39 0.49
Attended rel. services at age 15 3990 0.42 0.49 3432 0.36 0.48 11012 0.59 0.49
High school graduate 4024 0.81 0.39 3487 0.84 0.37 11255 0.81 0.40
College graduate 4024 0.19 0.39 3487 0.17 0.38 11255 0.20 0.40
Relationship characteristics
Ended as marriage 4025 0.34 0.47 3495 0.40 0.49 11279 1.00 0.00
Relationship has ended 4025 0.49 0.50 3495 0.39 0.49 11279 0.28 0.45
Duration (years) 4025 5.07 5.46 3495 3.45 3.62 11279 16.03 11.36
Duration (total in years) 4025 8.90 7.90 3547 6.40 5.91 11279 16.03 11.36
Partner's characteristics
Spouse was prev. unmarried 4019 0.76 0.43 3495 0.71 0.45 11266 0.86 0.35
Age dierence (own-spouse) 3573 -0.61 4.87 3201 -0.50 4.84 11024 -0.28 4.21
Women at least 5 years older 3573 0.06 0.24 3201 0.08 0.26 11024 0.03 0.17
Male at least 5 years older 3573 0.24 0.43 3201 0.24 0.42 11024 0.20 0.40
Legislative status
Subject to alimony rights 3967 0.06 0.23 3495 0.74 0.44 11279 0.61 0.49
... with no child rules 3967 0.06 0.23 3495 0.53 0.50 11279 0.60 0.49
All statistics weighted by person-specic weights.
34Table 3: Summary statistics (panel sample)
Cohabitations Marriages
before the law after the law all
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev
Including all active relationships N=24286 N=15513 N=186304
Subject to alimony rights 0.05 0.21 0.49 0.50 0.42 0.49
Subject to alimony rights-no child rules 0.04 0.21 0.44 0.50 0.40 0.49
Studied 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.33 0.07 0.25
Worked 0.75 0.43 0.74 0.44 0.75 0.43
Worked full time 0.66 0.47 0.62 0.49 0.64 0.48
Stopped working 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.30 0.16 0.37
Number of children 0.87 1.15 0.86 1.16 1.68 1.27
Had a maternity leave 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.25
Had a paternity leave 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03
Including at least 10 years N=39066 N=26379 N=194427
Subject to alimony rights 0.04 0.18 0.34 0.47 0.40 0.49
Subject to alimony rights-no child rules 0.04 0.17 0.26 0.44 0.38 0.49
Studied 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.07 0.25
Worked 0.76 0.43 0.74 0.44 0.75 0.43
Worked full time 0.66 0.47 0.62 0.48 0.64 0.48
Stopped working 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.16 0.37
Number of children 0.90 1.12 0.93 1.14 1.66 1.27
Had a maternity leave 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.25
Had a paternity leave 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03
All statistics weighted by person-specic weights.
35Table 4: Impact of alimony rights on labor supply
Studied Worked Worked Work Maternity Paternity
full time interruptions leave leave
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Only relationships formed before a law was passed
Subject to alimony rights 0.020y -0.030 -0.047y 0.053y 0.024
(0.011) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.019)
Subject to alimony rights -0.040y 0.086* 0.104* -0.070y -0.002
male (0.018) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.003)
R-square 0.475 0.701 0.722 0.445 0.375 0.101
N 39066 39066 39066 39066 22242 16824
Panel B: All relationships except those \caught"
Subject to alimony rights 0.009 0.030 0.058y -0.059* -0.054y
(0.013) (0.021) (0.030) (0.025) (0.026)
Subject to alimony rights 0.019 -0.002 -0.018 0.038 -0.004
male (0.035) (0.023) (0.024) (0.033) (0.003)
R-square 0.485 0.716 0.731 0.445 0.375 0.094
N 63305 63305 63305 63305 35957 27348
Panel C: Only relationships formed after the legal change
Subject to alimony rights -0.003 0.008 0.032y -0.010 -0.002
(0.010) (0.020) (0.017) (0.010) (0.017)
Subject to alimony rights 0.015 0.030 0.011 -0.017 -0.002
male (0.022) (0.021) (0.014) (0.015) (0.003)
R-square 0.498 0.738 0.741 0.434 0.343 0.123
N 26379 26379 26379 26379 14883 11496
T-test of equality between the coecients...
Panel A vs. B (main eect) 0.48 4.16 y 8.01* 9.86** 6.33* 0.17
Panel A vs. B (interaction) 2.36 4.53* 8.88** 5.27*
Panel A vs. C (main eect) 2.71 1.78 7.67* 5.24* 1.10 0.06
Panel A vs. C (interaction) 4.05 y 1.94 6.61* 1.99
Equation (24) species the estimation equation for Panel B. Panel A excludes estimates of k and
Panel C includes only estimates of k, k, j and i from that equation. All regressions are weighted
using person-specic weights. The sample includes at least ten years following the beginning of any
cohabitation relationship or all the years if the relationship lasted longer. In Panel A, only relations
formed before the legislation changed are included, in Panel B, all relationships except years in which
relationships formed before the law were subject to alimony rights are included. In Panel C, only
relationships formed after the legal change are included.
Standard errors are clustered at the province level.
y: 10% signicance, *: 5% signicance, **: 1% signicance
36Table 5: Impact of alimony rules on labor supply-robustness checks
No child Only Before After Without Married Lagged
rules active rel. 1990 1980 Quebec
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Studied
Subject to alimony rights 0.020y 0.022 0.008 0.038* 0.013 0.002 0.030y
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.004) (0.016)
Subject to alimony rights -0.038y -0.034 -0.027 -0.075** -0.034 -0.003 -0.067*
male (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.030) (0.005) (0.023)
Will be subject to -0.008
alimony in 2 years (0.033)
Will be subject to 0.066
alimony in 2 years*male (0.040)
R-square 0.475 0.574 0.450 0.477 0.373 0.429 0.476
N 38793 24286 29212 27795 14848 150347 39066
Panel B: Worked full time
Subject to alimony rights -0.044y -0.028 -0.062y -0.031 -0.125** 0.008 -0.072**
(0.021) (0.022) (0.030) (0.027) (0.031) (0.007) (0.018)
Subject to alimony rights 0.097* 0.076y 0.127** 0.108* 0.229** -0.006 0.134**
male (0.030) (0.037) (0.035) (0.041) (0.065) (0.007) (0.036)
Will be subject to 0.045
alimony in 2 years (0.041)
Will be subject to -0.079
alimony in 2 years*male (0.061)
R-square 0.720 0.775 0.717 0.727 0.703 0.723 0.723
N 38793 24286 29212 27795 14848 150347 39066
Panel C: Work Interruption
Subject to alimony rights 0.070* 0.054 0.060 0.068y 0.021 -0.035** 0.052
(0.025) (0.030) (0.037) (0.029) (0.031) (0.008) (0.031)
Subject to alimony rights -0.080* -0.051 -0.082 -0.097* -0.054 0.054** -0.070
male (0.032) (0.044) (0.048) (0.033) (0.042) (0.014) (0.039)
Will be subject to -0.054
alimony in 2 years (0.044)
Will be subject to 0.077
alimony in 2 years*male (0.046)
R-square 0.435 0.471 0.423 0.443 0.439 0.523 0.446
N 38793 24286 29212 27795 14848 150347 39066
All regressions include the same controls as in Panel B of the previous table. All regressions are weighted using
person-specic weights. The sample includes at least ten years following the beginning of any cohabitation
relationship, except in column (2) where it includes only years where the cohabitation relationship was active.
The rst column only includes, as subject to alimony rules, couples who qualied because of the duration of their
relationship, not because they had children. The third restricts it to relationships that began before 1990, the
next one, to couples formed before 1980. The fth column excludes all couples from Quebec. The sixth only
includes married couples and the last includes an indicator for becoming subject to the law in 2 years.
Standard errors are clustered at the province level.
y: 10% signicance, *: 5% signicance, **: 1% signicance
37Table 6: Impact of alimony rights on labor supply-heterogenous eects
Studied Worked full time Work Interruptions
Main eect Interaction Main eect Interaction Main eect Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
By education:
Less than high school 0.021 0.000 0.029 0.014 0.096y -0.109
(0.022) (0.031) (0.036) (0.037) (0.044) (0.062)
High school graduate 0.027* -0.046 -0.053 0.107y 0.040 -0.045
(0.010) (0.030) (0.044) (0.054) (0.039) (0.051)
College graduate -0.019 -0.210 -0.184* 0.335** 0.032 -0.147
(0.048) (0.127) (0.073) (0.091) (0.078) (0.136)
By age:
Began rel. before age 21 0.063y -0.025 0.034 0.043 -0.002 0.021
(0.033) (0.057) (0.054) (0.118) (0.060) (0.052)
Began rel. between 22-27 -0.005 -0.017 -0.086 0.142* 0.085 -0.111
(0.017) (0.026) (0.047) (0.047) (0.064) (0.069)
Began rel. after 28 0.008 -0.081 -0.079y 0.117 0.069 -0.100
(0.044) (0.061) (0.037) (0.067) (0.073) (0.078)
By age dierence:
Fem. at least 5 yrs younger 0.063 -0.109** -0.090* 0.187** 0.158* -0.211*
(0.035) (0.017) (0.035) (0.049) (0.054) (0.075)
Within 5 years of spouse -0.012 -0.010 -0.024 0.031 0.016 -0.005
(0.024) (0.036) (0.025) (0.032) (0.055) (0.069)
Fem. at least 5 yrs older -0.003 0.062* 0.043 -0.107 -0.032 -0.030
(0.013) (0.025) (0.034) (0.060) (0.056) (0.057)
All regressions include the same controls as in Panel B of Table 4. All regressions are weighted using person-specic
weights. The sample includes at least ten years following the beginning of any cohabitation relationship. Each set of
columns and section of the table correspond to a regression. The table entries are the coecients of an indicator for
the couple being subject to alimony rules interacted with the characteristics as listed in the rst column of the table
(for columns (1), (3), (5)) and the interaction of that term with a dummy for the respondent being a male in columns
(2), (4) and (6).
Standard errors are clustered at the province level.
y: 10% signicance, *: 5% signicance, **: 1% signicance
38Table 7: Policy neutrality of alimony rights rules
Studied Worked Worked Work
Full-Time Interruption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Comparing new and old relationship (N=63493)
Formed after a legal change -0.076 0.003 0.017 -0.076**
(0.208) (0.034) (0.029) (0.020)
Formed after a legal change*male 0.001 0.003 -0.053 0.071**
(0.453) (0.036) (0.037) (0.021)
R-square 0.021 0.046 0.055 0.037
Panel B: Comparing new and long relationships over time (N=63493)
Formed after a legal change -0.013 0.004 0.020 -0.091**
(0.010) (0.033) (0.031) (0.021)
Formed after a legal change*male 0.033** -0.005 -0.061y 0.083**
(0.010) (0.032) (0.033) (0.024)
Formed after a legal change -0.002 -0.004* -0.005** 0.008**
time since beginning (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Formed after a legal change 0.000 0.004 0.006* -0.007**
time since beginning*male (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
R-square 0.032 0.047 0.056 0.039
All regressions include xed eects for province, year of observation and their in-
teractions with a male dummy. Regressions in Panel B also include controls for
the duration of the relationship and its interaction with being male. The sample
includes at least ten years following the beginning of any cohabitation relationship
except for years where the couple was subject to alimony rights when they had en-
tered into the relationship before the legal change. All regressions are weighted using
person-specic weights.
Standard errors are clustered at the province level.
y: 10% signicance, *: 5% signicance, **: 1% signicance
39Table 8: Impact of alimony rules on relationship stability
Relationship Cohabitation led Duration Duration
is over in 2001 to marriage (total)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Only relationships formed before a law was passed
Subj. to alimony rights -0.109 -0.117 -0.140** -0.177** 2.604* 2.125* 0.530 0.505
(0.081) (0.085) (0.025) (0.047) (0.806) (0.705) (0.762) (1.180)
Subj. to alimony rights 0.063 0.064 0.468 -1.122
male (0.063) (0.098) (0.517) (1.643)
R-square 0.294 0.308 0.262 0.275 0.917 0.921 0.480 0.495
N 4025 4025 4025 4025 4025 4025 4014 4014
Panel B: All relationships except those \caught"
Subj. to alimony rights 0.051 0.029 -0.007 0.017 -0.211* -0.347* -1.262y -0.587
(0.038) (0.035) (0.020) (0.029) (0.084) (0.114) (0.620) (0.692)
Subj. to alimony rights 0.063 -0.045 0.230y -1.806
male (0.043) (0.060) (0.108) (1.010)
R-square 0.261 0.269 0.262 0.276 0.955 0.956 0.502 0.516
N 7163 7163 7163 7163 7163 7163 7147 7147
Panel C: Only relationships formed after the legal change
Subj. to alimony rights -0.029 -0.059* 0.007 -0.036 -0.097y -0.046 -0.210 -0.149
(0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.025) (0.044) (0.091) (0.242) (0.414)
Subj. to alimony rights 0.082y 0.092y -0.108 -0.199
male (0.038) (0.044) (0.103) (0.627)
R-square 0.210 0.224 0.259 0.279 0.948 0.948 0.555 0.578
N 3495 3495 3495 3495 3495 3495 3489 3489
Equation (24) species the estimation equation for Panel B. Panel A excludes estimates of k and Panel
C includes only estimates of k, k and xed eects for province from that equation. All regressions are
weighted using person-specic weights.
Standard errors are clustered at the province level.
y: 10% signicance, *: 5% signicance, **: 1% signicance
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